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ABSTRACT 
It is shown that the core of a coalitional production economy 
with a balanced technology (Bohm [1974] ) is nonempty. even if the 
consumers have preferences which are intransitive. provided the 
preferences are convex and continuous. Since such preferences cannot 
be represented by utility functions. this result does not follow from 
the nonemptiness of the core of a characteristic function game. 
Rather. the approach is closer to that of Ichiishi's [1981] social 
coalitional equilibrium. 
THE CORE OF A COALITIONAL PRODUCTION ECONOMY WITHOUT ORDERED PREFERENCES 
Kim c. Border 
1 • INTRODUCTION
The object of this paper is to present a set of sufficient 
conditions under which the core of a coalitional production economy is 
nonempty, even though individuals may have preferences which are not 
orders, i.e., not complete or transitive. Concern among economists 
over the realism of this postulate can be traced back to the debates 
over whether integrability was a necessary condition for well behaved 
demand curves, and the question of intransitivity was directly 
addressed by Georgescu-Roegen [1936] . There is a fair body of 
evidence amassed by psych_ologists (e.g., Tversky [1969] ) that 
individual preferences may be intransitive. It is not surprising then 
that the past decade has seen a significant amount of work devoted to 
dispensing with this assumption. In addition to considerations of 
realism, parsimony demands that unnecessary hypotheses be discarded. 
The question of whether transitivity of preferences is 
necessary for a consumer to have well behaved demand correspondences 
has been addressed by Sonnenschein [1971] , Shafer [1974] , and Fountain 
[1981] . They show that it is not necessary to assume that consumers 
have transitive preferences in order to derive many of the properties 
attributed to the demand correspondences of transitve consumers. The 
question of the existence of equilibrium when consumers have 
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nonordered preferences has been examined by Schmeidler [1969] , Mas-
Colell [1974] , Gale and Mas-Collel [1975] , Shafer and Sonnenschein 
[1975] , and Shafer [1976] . Again the conclusion is that transitivity 
of preferences is irrelevant to the problem. 
The model of the coalitional production economy used here is 
that of Bohm [1974] . The method of analysis is necessarily different 
from Bohm's, as he make use of the nonemptiness of the core of a 
balanced game in characteristic function form. The problem is that to 
pass from a market economy to a game in characteristic function form 
requires that the traders have utility functions, and this in turn 
implies that preferences are complete and transitive. Corresponding 
to the core of a characteristic function form game is the set of 
strong equilibria of a strategic form game, that is, the set of 
strategy vectors that no coalition has any incentive to deviate from. 
The definition of strong equilibrium does not require that players 
have utility functions, only that they have preference relations. By 
modeling the market as a game in strategic form rather than in 
characteristic function form, the case of non-ordered preferences may 
be handled. 
Section 2 states a lemma on the existence of strong equilibria 
for a certain class of games. Section 3 contains a description of a 
variation of Bohm's model of a coalitional production economy and a 
theorem on the nonemptiness of the core. The theorem is proved by 
using the lemma on existence of strong equilibria. Section 4 proves 
the lemma, although some of the more tedious details have been 
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relegated to an appendix. Section S discusses the relation of this 
paper to the rest of the literature on intransitive preferences and 
possible extensions. 
2. A LEMMA W STR<llG EQUILIBRIUM
A game G is a tuple (N, CS.), (�), F, (P.)) where 1 1 
N = { l, • • •  ,n} denotes the set of players. Each player i has a set of 
Si of strategies potentially available to him. Set S = lT S. • ForiaN 1 
each coalition B C  N let SB= lT S . •  The set of strategies which are. B i 18 I 
jointly feasible for members of coalition B is denoted� C SB. The 
set of all feasible strategy vectors is denoted by F. 
Preferences are represented by a correspondence 
Pi : Si->-? Si. The interpretation is that yi a Pi(xi) means that yi 
is preferred to xi. Note that i's preferences depend only on his own 
strategy. This is highly restrictive in a game theoretic model, but 
adequate for dealing with the economic model considered. 
A strong equilibrium of G = (N, (Si)' (FB)' F, (Pi)) is an
x a S satisfying 
( i) x a F, 
(ii) there is no B c N and yB a � satisfying y� 8 P.(x.) for all1 1 1 
i a B. 
In order to prove the existence of strong equilibrium the 
following condition will be used. 
Balancedness : A family p of subsets of N is balanced if for 
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each B a p there is a '1J L 0 (called a balancing weight) such that for 
each i a N 
} '1J= l 
ia'liap 
The game G is balanced if whenever p is a balanced family with 
balancing weights {'1J}, and xB a� for each B a  p, then x a F where 
x. = } 'J.. x�. i ibJap i i 
LEMMA. Let G (N, (S.), (�), (P.)) be a game satisfying1 1 
k.
G l. For each i, S. is a nonempty compact convex subset of lR 1 1 
G2. For each B C  N, BF d, � is a nonempty compact subset of SB. 
G3. F is convex and compact. 
G4. For each i, 
(a) Pi has open graph, in Si X Si'
(b) xi J Pi(xi). 
(c) Pi(xi) is convex (but possibly empty). 
GS. G is balanced. 
Then G has a strong equilibrium. 
The proof of the lemma is postponed until after a discussion 
of the economic model which serves to motivate the definitions above. 
3 • 1BE MODEL OF THE ECONOMY
The model is basically that of Bohm [1974] , who presents 
several examples of technologies satisfying the assumptions. 
The commodity space is m.1• There is a finite set 
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N = {1, • • •  , n} of consumers who are characterized by their consumption 
sets S. c m.1, their preference correspondences P. : S. -7-7 S., and 1 1 1 1 
their endowments w. e m.1• With each coalition B C  N is associated a 1 
nonempty production possibility set yB c m.1• The total production 
possibility set is Y C m.L. 
An allocation is a list of commodity vectors (x.). _ 1 1 1 - ,, • • •  ,D 
such that x. e S. for each i e N and �x. - �w. e Y. 1 1 1 1 1 18 
all allocations is denoted F. 
The set of 
For each B c N, B � d, define � by x8 e � if and only if 
x� e S. for all i e B and · 1 1 
r xi - r wi 8 y
B, 
teB teB 
We say that coalition B can improve upon allocation x = (xi)
if there is zB s � 
The .£.2!£ of 
satisfying z� B P.(x.) for all i s S.1 1 1 
_, _B the economy E = (N, CS.), (w.), Cr), 1 1 Y, (Pi)) is 
the set of all allocations which cannot be improved upon by any 
nonempty coalition. 
The technology ((YB), Y) is balanced if for every balanced 
family p of subsets of N with balancing weights 
f >iiyB c Y.
BsP 
>ii· 
In particular since {N} is a balanced family with balancing weight 
� = 1, � C Y. Similarly, �y{i} c Y.
For any set X C m.1 let AX denote the asymptotic cone of X. 
THEOREM. Let the economy E = (N, CS.), (w.), (yB), Y, (P.)) satisfy 1 1 1 
the following assumptions. 
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El. For each i, Si C lB.� is closed, convex and bounded from below and
wi e Si. 
E2. For each i, 
(a) Pi= Si-7 Si has open graph in Si X Si.
(b) xi J Pi(xi).
(c) Pi(xi) is convex (but possibly empty.) 
E3. For each i, O s  y{il. 
E4. For each B c N, yB is closed and there is an xB s SB satisfying 
[Xi - r W. B yB • uB feB 1 
ES. Y is closed and convex and AY 0 lB.� 
E6. ( (yB), Y) is balanced. 
Then E has a nonempty core. 
{O} • 
Note that if 0 s yB for every coalition B, then assumption E4. 
will be satisfied. 
Proof of Theorem. Bohm [1974] has already shown that under these 
hypotheses each � is compact and that F is compact. Each � is 
nonempty by assumption E4. 
Letting Si be a compact convex subset of Si large enough so 
that for all B C N, p8 C TI S. and F s 1T S . •
isB 1 isN 1 
Then the game (N, (S.), (p8), F, (P. ls )) satisfies the1 1 . 1 
hypotheses of the lemma. The only hypothesis that needs checking is 
that of balancedness: Let p be a balanced family of coalitions with 
balancing weights 
� 
and let xB s p8 for each B e p. Then there is a 
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yB s yB such that ) x� = ) w i + YB. feB feB Then setting x. = 
) 
�
lC� it1 iilJep 1 
follows that ) xi = ) . ) �wi + ) �YBtBN tBN 1insp ifsp 
= ) wi + ) �y8.tBN ifsp 
Since ((yB), Y) is balanced, �xi - �wi s Y and so x e F. Thus by
the lemma the game (N, (S.), (p8), (P.ls )) has a strong equilibrium1 1 . 1 
which is clearly an allocation in the core of the economy E. 
4 • PROOF OF LFJIMA 
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The following is a well-known alternate characterization of 
balanced families. Let e1, • • •  ,en be the unit coordinate vectors in
JR N and set � = lif e • 1 � i Then P is a balanced family if and only if
1£ 
� e co {� : B s p}, where co denotes the convex hull.
The proof relies on the following result which is a special 
case of a theorem of Fan [1969] and Browder [19671. Let KC JRn be 
compact and convex, and let y, µ : K -? -> lR n be upper hemi-
continuous with compact and convex values. Suppose that for each 
x e K there exist three points y s K, u s y(x), v s µ(x) and a real 
number A > 0 such that y = x + A(u - v). Then there is a z s K such 
that y(z) n µ(z) F d. 
Begin the proof of the lemma by defining vi Si X Si -> JR+ 
by 
v.(y.,x.) =distance [(x.,y.),(Gr P.)c] ,1 1 1 1 1 1 
where Gr Pi= {(xi,zi) = zi s Pi(xi)}, the graph of Pi. 
construction is due to Shafer and Sonnenschein [1975] .) 
(This 
Each v. is 1 
continuous (as Gr Pi is open) and vi(yi,xi) > 0 if and only if
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Yi e Pi(xi). The function vi acts as a "pseudo-utility" for ·Pi' and 
possesses the following important property. Suppose v.(z�,x.) 2 w for 1 1 1 
k = l, • • •  ,p. Let z. be a convex combination of z�, • • •  ,z�. Then 1 1 1 
vi(zi,xi) 2 w. The proof of this may be found in the appendix. 
For each B C N set 
vBcx> = {w e :m.N : 3 zBe� VisB w. i v.(z�. x.)}.1 1 1 1 
If i J B, then w e  vBcx) places no restriction on w . •  Thus x is a 1 
strong equilibrium if and only if x e F and U vBCx) 0 JR� = d. 
BeN 
The sets V B(x) are analogues of the characteristic function of 
a game without side payments and the arguments of Shapley [1973] and 
Ichiishi [1981] may be applied. The following line of argument is 
very similar to Ichiishi [1981] . 
Since each vi is continuous and each r!1 is compact, there is
B _R B some M 2 0 such that for all x e S, and z B �. v.(z., x. ) � M for1 1 1 
all i e B. Put ai = -Mnei e lR.n (wh�re ei is the ith unit coordinate
vector of m.n) and set a= co {ai = i e N}. For each B c N set 
�=filf" ai. 
teB 
For each y B a set 
�(y,x) =max {t > 0 :  y + t(l, • •  ,l) B U vBCx)}, and put
B CN 
w(y,x) = y + �(y,x)(l, • • •  ,l). Note that �(y,x) < M(n + 1) and 
w(y,x) � M(l, • • •  ,l). Since v. is always nonnegative, V {k}(x) always 1 
includes {w : w
k
� 0}. Suppose that some w
k
(y,x) < 0, then
w(y,x) = y + �(y,x)(l, • • •  ,l) is in the interior of y {k}(x), which 
contradicts the definition of �. Thus w(y,x) 2 O. 
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The next step is to show that if x B F and w(y,x) i O, then x 
is a strong equilibrium. Suppose not. Then for some z B 
z� B P. (x) for all i e B, so v. (z�,xi) > 0 for all i e B.1 1 1 1 
8 �. 
Thus there 
is a w e vBCx) with w > O. But then y + �(y,x)(l, • • •  ,l) = w(y,x) i 0 
is in the interior of vBCx), which contradicts the definition of �.
Thus the search for a strong equilibrium has been reduced to 
the following problem : Find x e F and y e a such that w(y,x) i 0. To 
this end make the following constructions. For each B e N, set 
r8cx> = {y s a :  w(y,x) s vBcx)}. Let E(x,y) equal
{z e F : z minimizes distance [v( • ,x), {w w i w(y,x)}]} 
where the ith component of v(x,y) is vi(xi,yi).
Define y,µ : s X a -7-7 s x a by 
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y(x,y) {x} X co {� : y s r8cx>l
and 
µ(x,y) =co E(x,y) X {�}. 
The correspondences y and µ so defined satisfy the hypothesis 
of the Fan-Browder theorem. The proof of this claim is given in the 
appendix. 
It follows from the Fan-Browder theorem that there are 
• • x, y, x , y satisfying 
• • • • (x, y) 8 µ(x . y )  n y(x . y ). 
In other words 
(1) x e co E(x•,y•).
(2) 
(3) 
y = �· 
• x = x 
• 
- • ...B • (4) y s co {�: y e 1-cx )}.
• ...B • By (2) and (4), � = {B. : y s 1-cx )} is balanced, and by the
definition of �. w(y•,x•) e vBcx•) for all B s �. Thus for each B e �
there exists zB B � satisfying w. (y*,x•) � v.(z�. x�) for all i e B.1 1 1 1 
Let {"Bl be the associated balancing weights. Since the game is
balanced, z• e F where z• = } "Bz�. 
teB 
Since z� is a convex combination1 
of the z� for i e B and v.(z�,x�) 2 w. (y•,x•), it follows that1 1 1 1 1 
vi(z•i,x•i) 2 �(y•,x•). 
1 1  
By  ( 1) and (3), x• £co E(x•,y•). Since z•  s F and 
v(z•,x•) 2 w(y•,x•), if z B E(x•,y•), then v(z,x•) 2 w(y•,x•). 
Suppose that wi(y•,x•) > O. Then for all z £ E(x•,y•), v(zi,x•i) > 0
as well. Thus zi s Pi(x•i). Thus x• s co E(x•,y•) implies that 
x•i £ Pi(x•i), a contradiction. Thus w(y•,x•) � O. Also since F is
convex and E(x•,y•) CF, it follows that x• s F. Thus x• is a strong 
equilibrum. 111 
S. POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS 
The theorem on the nonemptiness of the core of an economy is 
not strictly stronger than that of Bohm [1974). His assumption that 
preferences are representable by utility functions is traded off 
against the assumption that Y is convex and each � is nonempty. 
The lemma on strQng equilibria is not as strong as one would 
like. It would be nice if the lem ma could be proved under the 
following hypotheses, which are more along the lines of Shafer and 
Sonnenschein [1975). It is desirable to make� depend in a 
continuous way on x. This generalization is straightforward. The 
other desirable generalization would be to allow Pi : X -? -?  Xi' i.e., 
to allow i's preferences over strategies to depend on the other's 
strategies. Th.is is a more serious obstacle. 
To see the nature of the difficulty, for zB e SB let xlzB be 
defined by 
CxlzB). 1 
{ x�
zi
i J B 
i £ B. 
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To carry out the preceding argument, it would be necessary to show that 
if v.(z�.xlzB) > w for B s p and if z is given by z. = �A_z�. that1 1 - 1 -11 1 1£ 
vi(zi,z) 2 w. This is true if the graph of Pi is convex, but it
difficult to attach any interpretation to this condition. Also the 
requirement of convex graph runs counter to another desired weakening, 
namely only assuming that x. J co P.(x). This latter assumption is1 1 
sufficient for the existence of a noncooperative equilibrium of an 
abstract economy and it would be nice to carry it over to the 
cooperative case. 
Another possible generalization would be to specify coalition 
structures as in Ichiishi [1981), but this seems pointless unless the 
hypotheses on preferences can be relaxed. 
APPENDIX 
Quasi-concavity .of vi in its first argument. 
k f k Let v.(z.,x.) L w, k = l, • •  ,,p and let z. = A z. be a1 1 1 1 Jt=l ·11: 1
convex combination of z�, • •  ,,zPi. Th.en v.(z.,x.) L w.1 1 1 1 
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For convenience, the common subscript i will be omitted. If 
w = 0, the result is trivial, If w > 0, let N (x,zk) be an open ballw 
of radius w about (x,zk). From the definition of v, 
Nw(x,z
k) C Gr P, k = l,,,,,p, Let (x',z') a Nw(x,z), Th.en
l<x' - x,z' - z)I < w so 
(x + (x' - x), zk + (z' - z)) B N (x,zk) C Gr P. w 
zk + z' - z a P(x'), Since P(x') is convex, 
Th.us
z' = L l.._ (zk + z' - z) e P(x'). Th.us N (x,z) C Gr P, so v(z,x) L w.
lt=l·11: w 
The correspondences y and µ satisfy the Fan-Browder hypotheses, 
It is straightforward to verify that y and µ are upper hemi-
continuous with nonempty compact convex values, It is harder to see 
. I 
that for every (x,y) e S X A, there exist (x',y') e µ(x,y), 
(x'',y'') C y(x,y) and A) 0 satisfying 
(x,y) + ilx',y') - (x'',y'')] BS X A. The argument is virtually 
identical to one used by lchiishi [1981] with only slightly different 
correspondences. Put x'' = x, y' =� and choose any x' e co E(x,y). 
Th.en x + A{x' - x'') = (1 - A)x +AX' e S for any A a [0,1] .  Let 
B c N = {i: yi > OJ. It is shown below that 
co {ai:i a BJ c U rtcx>. Given this, choose e c B so that
ecB 
y B rtcx>. Put y'' =me· Th.en (x'',y'') B y(x,y). For AB [O,l], 
define yA = y + A(y' - y'') = y +A(� - me)· Th.en
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n A n n n [Yi = [Yi + A( [ �i - [ mei) -Mn + A(-Mn + Mn) = -Mn and if A1=1 1=1 1=1 1=1 
is small enough, YA � 0 so YA e A. 
The argument that co {ail i e BJ c U rtcx> for all B is due
ecB 
to Shapley [1973], If B = N this just says that w(y,x) a vBcx) for 
some B, so suppose that B F N, so that IBI < n, Let 
ye rt(x) n co {ai : i e BJ. We need to show that e CB. Since 
y a rtCx), w(y,x) e V e(x), so wj(y,x) = yj + �(y,x) � M for all j e e.
But f" y. =-Mn, and for some k e B, yk is less than equal the averageJ'BB J 
-Mn I I of the yj's for j a B, so yk 
i TBT < -M as B < n. But w(y,x) 2 0
so y
k + �(y,x) 
2 0, so �(y,x) ) M. Th.is and yj + �(y,x) � M for j e e 
imply that y. < 0 for all j e e. Since ye co {ai : i e BJ and y. < 0J J 
for j e e it follows that e CB. Ill 
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